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generation, turning local and rural communities into prominent actors in the energy 
transition. The recast of the EU Renewable Energy Directive follows this trend, 
prompting all EU Member States to adopt measures to spearhead community energy. 
Yet to date, only a handful of ‘pioneer’ EU Member States – most saliently Denmark, 
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of community energy. This article reflects on the role of law and policy in turning 
grassroots community action into a mainstream means for renewable energy 
generation. It unpacks the regulatory questions underlying the notion of community 
energy embedded in the Renewables Directive, looking at how these have been 
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ultimately to identify an agenda for further scholarly enquiry.  
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1 Introduction 
The fight against climate change requires replacing fossil fuel-based energy 
generation technologies with renewable ones,1 while at the same time pursuing the 
Sustainable Development Goal to ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, 
and modern energy for all’.2 The quest for the tools to deliver this clean energy 
transition raises questions on the ways in which change is enacted, and the role of law 
and policy in this context. Reliance on fossil-fuel based energy generation and the 
related energy governance arrangements undoubtedly created winners and losers, but 
changing the status quo entails finding new equilibria,3 engendering change at the 
pace and scale needed.4 Polycentric,5 bottom-up6 approaches have increasingly been 
advocated for as means to deliver a democratic and inclusive energy transition. 
In this fast moving and increasingly decentralised energy landscape, local and 
rural communities have unwittingly become protagonists of the energy transition. The 
term ‘community energy’ is commonly used to identify situations in which 
communities are involved in the production of renewable energy, regardless of the 
type of technology deployed. The literature often rather optimistically portrays 
community energy as a means to engender greater legitimacy and democratisation in 
energy governance, 7  tackle energy poverty, 8  and achieve greater ‘energy justice’.9 
                                                 
1 According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) the share of the energy 
mix coming from renewables is expected to rise to 21% by 2030, IRENA, ‘REthinking Energy 2017: 
Accelerating the Global Energy Transformation’ (IRENA 2017) 23-24.  
2 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc 
A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015) 54. 
3 See Ioan Fazey and others, ‘Transformation in a Changing Climate: A Research Agenda’ 
(2017) 9 Climate and Development 1, 10. 
4 See Laurence Delina and Benjamin Sovacool, ‘Of Temporality and Plurality: An Epistemic 
and Governance Agenda for Accelerating Just Transitions for Energy Access and Sustainable 
Development’ (2018) 34 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 1. 
5 This term is famously used in the works of Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, the 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (CUP 1990). In the context of the energy transition, see 
Andreas Goldthau and Benjamin Sovacool, ‘The Uniqueness of the Energy Security, Justice, and 
Governance Problem’ (2012) 41 Energy Policy 232, 234. 
6 See for example the use of this term in Marjan Peeters and Thomas Schomerus, Renewable 
Energy Law in the EU: Legal Perspectives on Bottom-up Approaches (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014). 
7 See for example Tineke van der Schoor and Bert Scholtens, ‘Power to the People: Local 
Community Initiatives and the Transition to Sustainable Energy’ (2015) 43 Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 666; Soren Becker and Conrad Kunze, ‘Transcending Community Energy: Collective 
and Politically Motivated Projects in Renewable Energy (CPE) across Europe’ (2014) 8 People Place 
and Policy 180; Matthew Burke and Jennie Stephens, ‘Energy Democracy: Goals and Policy 
Instruments for Sociotechnical Transitions’ (2017) 33 Energy Research & Social Science 35. 
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Schlosberg even suggests that community energy may be regarded as a manifestation 
of ‘sustainable materialism’, embodying resistance to power, coupled with a ‘post-
materialist’ approach to energy production, characterised by a concern for the 
environment.10  
Although energy democratisation, decentralisation and even independence11 
are undoubtedly desirable objectives, the widespread uptake of community energy 
requires significant structural adjustment to governance systems built around large-
scale energy production and distribution. 12  The push towards this structural 
adjustment underlies the recast of the EU Renewable Energy Directive (Renewables 
Directive) – one of the cornerstones of EU climate and energy policy and a key means 
to enable the energy transition in the EU.13 The recast Directive includes for the first 
time provisions to stimulate the formation of ‘renewable energy communities’ in all 
EU Member States, to be implemented by 2021.14 These provisions largely leave it to 
national and subnational law-makers and policy-makers to address the manifold 
regulatory complexities associated with moving community energy from grassroots to 
mainstream. Measures promoting community energy are expected to be included also 
in the recast Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity, 
currently under preparation.15 However, only a few Member States – most saliently, 
Denmark, Germany and the UK, and within the UK, Scotland – have already accrued 
significant regulatory experience with the mainstreaming of community energy.16 The 
                                                                                                                                           
8 See for example Rob W Saunders, Robert JK Gross and Joanne Wade, ‘Can Premium Tariffs 
for Micro-Generation and Small Scale Renewable Heat Help the Fuel Poor, and If So, How? Case 
Studies of Innovative Finance for Community Energy Schemes in the UK’ (2012) 42 Energy Policy 78. 
9 See for example Kirsten Jenkins and others, ‘Energy Justice: A Conceptual Review’ (2016) 
11 Energy Research & Social Science 174, 177. 
10 David Schlosberg and Romand Coles, ‘The New Environmentalism of Everyday Life: 
Sustainability, Material Flows and Movements’ (2016) 15 Contemporary Political Theory 160. 
11 See for example Benjamin Sovacool, ‘Energy Policymaking in Denmark: Implications for 
Global Energy Security and Sustainability’ (2013) 61 Energy Policy 829; Bill Slee and Jelte 
Harnmeijer, ‘Community Renewables: Balancing Optimism with Reality’ in Geoffrey Wood and Keith 
Baker (eds), A Critical Review of Scottish Renewable and Low Carbon Energy Policy (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2017) 37–39.  
12 Joseph Tomain, Clean Power Politics: The Democratization of Energy (CUP 2017) 204. 
13 Directive 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the 
use of energy from renewable sources, [2018] OJ L328/82 [Recast Renewables Directive]. 
14 ibid Article 4.8. 
15  The proposal for a directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity 
COM/2016/0864 (2016) recasts Directive 2009/72/EC. Since the drafting process of the directive’s text 
remains ongoing at the time of writing, the present article only focuses on the provisions on community 
energy in the recast Renewables Directive.  
16 See for example Colin Nolden, ‘Governing Community Energy—Feed-in Tariffs and the 
Development of Community Wind Energy Schemes in the United Kingdom and Germany’ (2013) 63 
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evidence emerging from these States suggests that there are regulatory complexities 
associated with the mainstreaming of community energy, which are not easy to 
resolve.17  
Much literature points to the need for greater reflection on the role of law and 
policy in this connection.18 Yet little legal scholarship has looked at this matter to 
date. 19  At a time when the EU is spearheading community energy, a scholarly 
reflection on the regulatory experience of Member States that may be regarded as 
pioneers in this field is particularly timely. Lessons learnt from the implementation of 
measures stimulating community energy are expected to be useful for all states 
looking at bolstering citizens’ involvement in renewable energy generation, both 
within and outside the EU. This is therefore a critical moment to examine and 
consolidate what we know about community energy, to understand what works, 
when, and why.  
The present article sets out to address this gap in the literature. The objective 
is to paint a picture of what we know already on the role of law and policy in 
facilitating the uptake of community energy, mapping existing knowledge and 
highlighting areas for further research. The aim is not so much to challenge the use of 
                                                                                                                                           
Energy Policy 543; Marieke Oteman, Mark Wiering and Jan-Kees Helderman, ‘The Institutional Space 
of Community Initiatives for Renewable Energy: A Comparative Case Study of the Netherlands, 
Germany and Denmark’ (2014) 4 Energy, Sustainability and Society 11; ClientEarth and Community 
Power, ‘Community Power: Model Legal Frameworks for Citizen-owned Renewable Energy’ 
(ClientEarth 2014) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/projects/sites/iee-
projects/files/projects/documents/model_legal_frameworks_2014.pdf  accessed 29 January 2019; 
British Academy, ‘Community Energy Generation’ (British Academy 2016) 
http://www.britac.ac.uk/policy/Energypolicy.cfm accessed 25 January 2019; Frank Geels and others, 
‘The Enactment of Socio-Technical Transition Pathways: A Reformulated Typology and a 
Comparative Multi-Level Analysis of the German and UK Low-Carbon Electricity Transitions (1990–
2014)’ (2016) 45 Research Policy 896. 
17 See Aileen McHarg, ‘Community Benefit Through Community Ownership of Renewable 
Generation in Scotland: Power to the People?’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), Sharing the 
Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity (OUP 2016); Anita Rønne, ‘Opposition to Wind 
Farms and Possible Responses of the Legal System’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), 
Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity: Legal Change and Impact on 
Communities (OUP 2016); Marie Leer Jørgensen, ‘Compensation Schemes and Distributive Fairness in 
Wind Energy Projects’ (European Environmental Law Forum Annual Conference, Copenhagen, 2017) 
http://law.au.dk/fileadmin/Jura/dokumenter/forskning/EELF/MARIE_LEER__31.08.pdf accessed 25 
January 2018. 
18 See for example Bill Slee, ‘Is There a Case for Community-Based Equity Participation in 
Scottish on-Shore Wind Energy Production? Gaps in Evidence and Research Needs’ (2015) 41 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 540; Richard Cowell and Patrick Devine-Wright, ‘A 
“Delivery-Democracy Dilemma”? Mapping and Explaining Policy Change for Public Engagement 
with Energy Infrastructure’ (2018) 20 J of Env Policy & Planning 499; Franziska Mey and Mark 
Diesendorf, ‘Who Owns an Energy Transition? Strategic Action Fields and Community Wind Energy 
in Denmark’ (2018) 35 Energy Research & Social Science 108, 115. 
19 With the sole possible exception of McHarg (n 17). 
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community energy as a means to engender the energy transition. Rather more 
modestly, this article strives to improve understanding of what law- and policy-
makers can do in order to support community energy, addressing the challenges and 
averting the perverse outcomes experienced by early movers. 
In order to develop a greater understanding of the regulatory landscape that 
has enabled the mainstreaming of community energy, this article couples the analysis 
of law and policies in pioneer EU Member States with a review of literature from the 
social sciences.20 Pursuant to a comparative socio-legal approach, the differences and 
similarities between laws and policies in pioneer countries are scrutinised in light of 
social sciences literature on the implementation of the said laws and policies. This 
desk-based study was combined with participant observation at selected public 
meetings where the implementation of community energy policies was discussed, and 
informal interviews with community actors, businesses and professionals supporting 
community energy projects. 21  While not quantitatively representative, real-life 
observation and informal interviews were an important complement to developing the 
understanding, expounded in this article, of how community energy policies work in 
practice.  
The remainder of the article is divided into three parts. The first considers the 
complexities underling the very notion of community energy, both in the literature 
and in practice. The second section unpacks the regulatory questions associated with 
community energy, looking at how these have been addressed in the recast 
Renewables Directive and in pioneer Member States, and flagging the challenges 
experienced. The conclusion reflects on what we know already about the role of law 
and policy in making community energy happen, highlighting gaps in knowledge that 
require further research.  
2 Defining Community Energy 
 
                                                 
20 As suggested also in Roger Cotterell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted 
Sociologically?’ (1998) 25 JLS 171. 
21 The public events include the 2015-2017 editions of the Community and Renewable Energy 
Scheme Conference, held in Stirling; and the 2017 Local Energy Challenge Fund Showcase, held in 
Glasgow; as well as side-events on community energy held at the Conferences of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in the same years. 
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The term community energy is of fairly recent coinage, but has rapidly gained traction 
both in policy and scholarship parlance. In one of the earliest conceptualisations, 
Walker and Devine-Wright distinguish between process (who a given project is 
owned and managed by) and outcome (who benefits from the project).22 From the 
perspective of process, they argue, what matters is who a renewable energy project ‘is 
developed and run by’ and ‘who is involved and has influence’. 23  From the 
perspective of outcome, conversely, what matters is ‘how the outcomes of a project 
are spatially and socially distributed’ and ‘who benefits from it in economic or social 
terms.’24 So a community may own a renewable energy generation plant and benefit 
from it, or, conversely, a community may not own the plant, but still benefit from it. 
This definition emphasises, on the one hand, a degree of community agency,25 and on 
the other, an element of community recipience of advantages from projects in which 
they are not necessarily actively engaged with. It is possible furthermore to 
distinguish between cases where a community takes the initiative and establishes a 
joint venture with a commercial developer (proactive shared ownership); and cases 
where members of a given community are simply offered the possibility to purchase 
shares in a project led by a commercial developer (reactive shared ownership). 
This conceptualisation largely builds on the grassroots origin of community 
energy, and has greatly influenced subsequent literature, 26  as well as substantive 
policy developments.27 Law and policy documents on community energy,28 however, 
largely focus on process, rather than outcome, and define community energy projects 
                                                 
22 Gordon Walker and Patrick Devine-Wright, ‘Community Renewable Energy: What Should 
It Mean?’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy 497, 498. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 As noted also in ClientEarth (n 16) 31. 
26 See for example Gill Seyfang and Alex Haxeltine, ‘Growing Grassroots Innovations: 
Exploring the Role of Community-Based Initiatives in Governing Sustainable Energy Transitions’ 
(2012) 30 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 381; Mhairi Aitken, Claire Haggett 
and David Rudolph, ‘Wind Farms Community Engagement Good Practice Review’ (ClimateXchange 
2014); Claire Haggett and Mhairi Aitken, ‘Grassroots Energy Innovations: The Role of Community 
Ownership and Investment’ (2015) 2 Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports 98; McHarg (n 
17) 301–305.  
27 See for example UK Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Community 
Energy Strategy (2014) 47; Scottish Government, Community Energy Policy Statement (2015) 6. 
28 See for example, for England: DECC (n 27); and DECC, Community Engagement for 
Onshore Wind Developments: Best Practice Guidance for England, 2014. For Scotland: Scottish 
Government (n 27); and Scottish Government, Good Practice Principles for Shared Ownership of 
Onshore Renewable Energy Developments (2015).  
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as those where communities own, in full or in part, energy generation plants.29 The 
notion of community energy in regulatory practice, therefore, does not merely entail 
that local residents be heard, or receive so-called benefit packages, but rather centres 
on communities’ partial or total ownership and management of renewable energy 
generation plants. 
This understanding is manifest also in the 2018 recast Renewables Directive.30 
The Directive is a key piece of EU climate change policy and of the Energy Union, 
which envisions a central role for citizens in the energy transition away from fossil 
fuels.31 As such, it is unsurprising that the Directive includes specific provisions to 
stimulate the formation of ‘renewable energy communities’, which it defines as a 
‘legal entity’: 
 
a) which, in accordance with the applicable national law, is based on open and voluntary 
participation, is autonomous, and is effectively controlled by shareholders or members that are 
located in the proximity of the renewable energy projects owned and developed by that legal 
entity;   
b) the shareholders or members of which are natural persons, SMEs or local authorities, including 
municipalities;  
c) the primary purpose of which is to provide environmental, economic or social community 
benefits for its shareholders or members or for the local areas where it operates, rather than 
financial profits.32 
 
The criteria to identify community energy projects listed in the Directive 
revolve around the nature of shareholders and the purpose of the endeavour.  They 
bundle together a diverse set of actors, encapsulating projects whose shareholders or 
members are natural persons, local authorities, including municipalities, or Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs).33 As a result, diverse entities fall within the scope of the 
notion of community energy drawn up by the Directive, such as, for example, a 
biomass power plant partially owned and run by a local council, or a wind farm 
wholly owned by a remote island community. What meaning will be attached to the 
expression ‘effective control’ in practice remains to be seen. Different criteria – 
including, for example, a 51% community ownership requirement – were considered 
                                                 
29 See for example DECC, Community Energy Strategy (2014) 47; Scottish Government, 
Community Energy Policy Statement (2015) 6. This observation is also made in ClientEarth (n 16) 5.  
30 Recast Renewables Directive (n 13). 
31 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European 
Investment Bank, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy, COM/2015/080 (2015) 2. 
32 Recast Renewables Directive (n 13) Article 2.16 (emphasis added). 
33 ibid. 
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and discarded during the Directive’s drafting process. 34  No criterion for effective 
community control was ultimately enshrined in the Directive, which merely specifies 
how, for private undertakings, participation in community projects should not 
constitute their primary commercial or professional activity.35  
This notion of renewable energy community is distinct from that of ‘self-
consumer’, which is defined by the recast Directive as: 
 
a final customer operating within its premises located within confined boundaries or, where 
permitted by a Member State, within other premises, who generates renewable electricity for 
its own consumption, and who may store or sell self-generated renewable electricity, provided 
that, for nonhousehold renewable self-consumers, those activities do not constitute their 
primary commercial or professional activity.36  
 
The notion of self-consumer, too, encompasses diverse scenarios, such as, for 
example, residents fitting solar panels on their roof, or a farmer installing a windmill 
to cater for the energy needs of his/her farm. The recast Renewables Directive 
specifically contemplates also the possibility that self-consumers act in groups37 and 
that their installations be managed by third parties, which are not to be regarded as 
renewable self-consumers themselves.38 
The distinguishing features of the notion of renewable energy community vis-
à-vis that of self-consumer in the Directive are the type of agency involved, and the 
purpose and size of projects. With regard to agency, the notion of self-consumer does 
not necessarily entail collective action, but that of energy community does. As far as 
size is concerned, the recast Directive allows Member States to restrict preferential 
treatment only to self-consumers producing renewable energy below a certain 
threshold,39 whereas no such limitation is provided for community energy. This in 
turn suggests that community energy projects may generate larger amounts of energy 
and entail a greater degree of professionalisation. Finally, while the main objective of 
self-consumers is to produce energy for themselves and to sell only the excess to the 
grid, community energy projects are expected to provide ‘environmental, economic or 
                                                 
34 See the criteria listed in EU Commission, Proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the 
use of energy from renewable sources, COM/2016/767 (2016), Article 22.  
35 Recast Renewables Directive (n 13) Article 22.1. 
36 ibid., Article 2.14. 
37 ibid., Article 2.15. 
38 ibid., Article 21.1.5. 
39 ibid., Article 21.3.c sets the threshold at 30 kW of total installed capacity.  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social community benefits for its members or the local areas where it operates, rather 
than financial profits’.40  
The recast Renewables Directive requires Member States to adopt ‘enabling 
frameworks to promote and facilitate’ both renewable energy communities and 
renewable self-consumption, by removing unjustified regulatory and administrative 
barriers. 41  The main elements of these enabling frameworks and the related 
implementation measures will have to be reported in updates of Member States’ 
integrated national energy and climate plans and progress reports.42 
Thus, Member States are expected to enable consumers to generate renewable 
energy for their own consumption, free from discriminatory or disproportionate 
procedures and any charge or fee.43 In relation to the electricity they consume from or 
feed into the grid, self-consumers should be able to generate, store and sell their 
excess production, without being subject to discriminatory or disproportionate 
procedures and charges and to network charges that are not cost-reflective.44 Equally, 
Member States are asked to enable communities to produce, consume, store and sell 
renewable energy without being subject to unjustified or discriminatory conditions or 
procedures.45  
The recast Renewables Directive does not attempt to solve all the intricate 
regulatory questions associated with facilitating the uptake of community energy, 
which are left to Member States to address. The Directive does, however, point to a 
set of factors – such as capacity-building, access to information, finance and markets 
– that have been crucial in the practice of those Member States with greater regulatory 
experience with the mainstreaming of community energy. The picture emerging from 
these pioneer Member States is multifaceted. The historically important role of the 
community sector in Denmark’s energy transition has been widely reported in the 
literature, 46  but has faltered in recent years. 47  Germany’s more recent and rather 
                                                 
40 ibid., Article 2.15. 
41 ibid., Articles 21.6 and 22.4. 
42 ibid., Articles 21.6 and 22.5. 
43 ibid., Article 21.2.a.ii. 
44 ibid., Article 21.2.a.i. 
45 ibid., Article 22.1. 
46 See for example Birgitte Egelund Olsen, ‘Wind Energy and Local Acceptance: How to Get 
Beyond the NIMBY Effect’ (2010) 19 EEELR 239; Sovacool (n 11) 836; ClientEarth (n 16) 36.  
47 See for example Mey and Diesendorf (n 18) and Thomas Bauwens, Boris Gotchev and Lars 
Holstenkamp, ‘What Drives the Development of Community Energy in Europe? The Case of Wind 
Power Cooperatives’ (2016) 13 Energy Research & Social Science 136, 140–141. 
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transformative experience with community energy – which presently delivers roughly 
20% of the renewable energy in the country48 – has raised serious concerns over costs 
and economic viability.49 The UK’s experience is much more recent and modest,50 but 
has clearly revealed the specific challenges associated with lack of institutionalised 
support and with the reform of energy subsidies for community energy.51 The next 
section takes a closer look at the experience of these pioneer EU Member States in 
order to unpack the main regulatory questions facing law-makers and policy-makers 
in the implementation of the recast Renewables Directive.  
3 Unpacking the Regulatory Questions 
Moving community projects beyond the grassroots level requires their mainstreaming 
into the energy system. This transformation in turn postulates the adoption of 
measures to define the scope of community energy, and to engender communities’ 
capacity to engage in the development and operation of renewable energy generation 
plants, including through access to finance, technologies and infrastructure, such as 
the electricity grid. Furthermore, even though community projects are expected to 
counter so-called ‘Not In My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) reactions associated with the 
development of renewable energy generation plants, 52  they also raise questions 
concerning who can participate in decision-making and how, who benefits from 
projects, and how the burdens are shared. This section considers these questions in 
                                                 
48  Leuphana University ‘Definition und Marktanalyse von Bürgerenergie in Deutschland’ 
(Leuphana University 2013) 
<https://digital.zlb.de/viewer/rest/image/15716863/definition_und_marktanalyse_von_buergerenergie_
in_deutschland_akt_2.pdf/full/max/0/definition_und_marktanalyse_von_buergerenergie_in_deutschlan
d_akt_2.pdf>  accessed 3 January 2019.  
49 See Geels and others (n 16) 905–906. 
50 See for example Gillian Bristow, Richard Cowell and Max Munday, ‘Windfalls for Whom? 
The Evolving Notion of “Community” in Community Benefit Provisions from Wind Farms’ (2012) 43 
Geoforum 1108.  
51  See REN21, ‘Renewables 2018 Global Status Report’ (REN21 2018) 41 
http://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/17-8652_GSR2018_FullReport_web_final_.pdf   
accessed 25 January 2019 and Community Energy England, ‘State of the Sector Report 2018’ 
(Community Energy England 2018) 29 <https://communityenergyengland.org/pages/state-of-the-
sector-report-2018/> accessed 4 December 2018. 
52  See for example Patrick Devine-Wright, ‘Beyond NIMBYism: Towards an Integrated 
Framework for Understanding Public Perceptions of Wind Energy’ (2005) 8 Wind Energy 125; Olsen 
(n 46); Patrick Devine-Wright, Renewable Energy and the Public: From NIMBY to Participation 
(Routledge 2014). 
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turn, looking at the regulatory answers provided in the recast Renewables Directive, 
and in the practice of pioneer Member States. 
3.1 Who Is the Community?  
Much literature investigates the involvement of local residents and stakeholders in 
decision-making on the generation of renewable energy, 53  drawing a distinction 
between deliberative participation, as opposed to mere strategies to engender social 
acceptance of the development of renewable energy generation plants. 54  To the 
knowledge of the author, however, no legal scholarship has so far looked at the 
specific criteria that are used to define the scope of community membership in law 
and policy.55  
In this regard, social scientists often distinguish between communities ‘of 
place’ – indicating those who happen to live in the area where a project is developed – 
and communities ‘of interest’ – indicating those who choose to actively engage with a 
project, regardless of where they live.56 Reportedly, both typologies of community 
engage in the generation of renewable energy in practice.57  
As seen above, the recast Renewables Directive lays down a set of criteria to 
identify renewable energy communities, largely focusing on communities of place. 
Firstly, the Directive requires that participation in projects be open and voluntary, 
autonomous, and effectively controlled by shareholders or members that are located 
in the proximity of the renewable energy projects owned and developed by that 
community.58 This requirement clearly prioritises those that live on or near a project 
                                                 
53 See for example Mhairi Aitken, Seonaidh McDonald and Peter Strachan, ‘Locating “Power” 
in Wind Power Planning Processes: The (Not so) Influential Role of Local Objectors’ (2008) 51 Jof 
Environmental Planning and Management 777; Maria Lee and others, ‘Public Participation and 
Climate Change Infrastructure’ (2013) 25 JEL 33; Maria Lee, ‘Knowledge and Landscape in Wind 
Energy Planning’ (2017) 37 LS 3. 
54 See Chiara Armeni, ‘Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: Reflecting on 
Planning and Community Benefits for Major Wind Farms’ (2016) 28 JEL 415.  
55 For reflections from other social sciences, see Neil Simcock, ‘Exploring How Stakeholders 
in Two Community Wind Projects Use a “Those Affected” Principle to Evaluate the Fairness of Each 
Project’s Spatial Boundary’ (2014) 19 Local Environment 241; Ben Campbell, Jon Cloke and Ed 
Brown, ‘Communities of Energy’ (2016) 3 Economic Anthropology 133. 
56 The elaboration of these notions is attributed to the classic works by Harold F Kaufmann, 
‘Towards an Interactional Concept of Community’ (1959) 38 Social Forces 8. See for example Mark 
Brennan, Jeffrey Birdger and Theodore R Alter, Theory, Practice, and Community Development 
(Routledge 2013) 41. 
57 See for example Bristow, Conwall and Munday (n 50). 
58 Recast Renewables Directive (n 13) Article 2.16.a. 
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site, vis-à-vis those that may have an interest in getting involved. However, no 
definition of proximity is provided in the recast Renewables Directive, which leaves it 
to Member States to identify the relevant criteria. The notion of community in the 
Directive is also rather open-ended, and encompasses subjects other than natural 
persons, such as local authorities, municipalities, and SMEs.59 The Directive makes 
some reference to equity considerations, asking that participation in community 
energy projects be accessible to ‘all consumers, including those in low-income or 
vulnerable households’.60  
The experience of pioneer Member States shows that law and policy 
contribute to determine the scope of community membership in various ways. When a 
community initiates a project, it is, in principle, free to define the boundaries of 
community membership, in the context of a process of self-identification.61 Thus, a 
community initiating a renewable energy generation project may decide, for example, 
to restrict membership to those residing on an island, or in a housing estate. In 
practice, the way a community self-defines is conditioned by eligibility criteria 
embedded in law and policy.62 For instance, if public funding to develop community 
energy projects is made available only to certain groups (e.g. rural communities), this 
would clearly condition the type of community projects that are likely to emerge. 
Similarly, the choice of legal form to shape community endeavours – most typically, 
cooperatives, trusts, foundations or community owned companies63 – is in principle 
left to communities’ discretion. Nevertheless, criteria concerning eligibility to access 
support or other incentives may condition a community’s choice of legal form. For 
example, the cooperative model has historically been predominant in Denmark,64 and 
is presently widespread in Germany,65 but not as frequent in the UK.66  
                                                 
59 Ibid., Article 2.16.b. 
60 Ibid., Article 22.4.f. 
61 For example, the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act, Part 1, 1.11 defines 
community as including ‘any community based on common interest, identity or geography’. 
62 As suggested also in Barry Barton and Michael Goldsmith, ‘Community and Sharing’ in 
Lila Barrera-Hernandez and others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource 
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Role of Community Ownership and Investment’ (2015) 2 Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy 
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Law and policy have an even more prominent role in determining the scope of 
community membership in relation to shared ownership. Danish law, for example, 
includes a specific definition of proximity, requesting wind farm developers to offer a 
20 percent ownership stake to those living at a distance of 4.5 km from the project 
site.67 If the shares are not sold, they may be offered to other local residents. This right 
only benefits individuals.68 The fact that shares are offered for sale further delimits the 
scope of eligible community members only to those with the financial means to make 
a purchase. 69  Availability of financial capital therefore crucially determines who 
becomes involved in a shared ownership project. 
This approach to shared ownership has reportedly failed to revitalise 
community support for renewable energy generation in Denmark.70 Indeed, whether 
or not this kind of shared ownership would qualify as community energy in the 
context of the recast Renewables Directive may be questioned. As seen above, the 
Directive requests that projects are ‘effectively controlled by shareholders or 
members that are located in the proximity of the renewable energy projects owned 
and developed by that community’.71 Low threshold of local ownership such as that 
required under Danish law may therefore not be enough for projects to be eligible for 
the treatment reserved to renewable energy communities by the recast Renewables 
Directive. The Directive’s reference to ‘applicable national law’, however, seems to 
leave much room for manoeuvre to national law-makers in this regard.72  
The approach embedded in Danish law has inspired similar measures in the 
UK, where a ‘community electricity right’ was introduced in 2015. This right gives 
‘individuals resident in a community or groups connected with a community, or both’ 
(sic), the right to buy a stake in new commercial renewable projects that are either 
located in the community (in case of land-based projects), or adjacent to the 
                                                                                                                                           
Local Entrepreneurship in Community-Based Renewable Energy Transition’ (2017) 101 Energy Policy 
332. 
66 See for example Gill Seyfang and others, ‘A Grassroots Sustainable Energy Niche? 
Reflections on Community Energy in the UK’ (2014) 13 Environmental Innovation and Societal 
Transitions 21. 
67 Promotion of Renewable Energy Act (Denmark) Act no. 1392 of 27 December 2008, 
sections 13–17. 
68 As noted also in Rønne (n 17) 185.  
69 ibid, 186. 
70 See the analysis in Mey and Diesendorf (n 18); and Bauwens, Gotchev and Holstenkamp (n 
47) 140–141. 
71 Recast Renewables Directive (n 13) Article 2.16.a. 
72 ibid. 
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community (in case of offshore projects). 73  The UK has opted for a voluntary 
approach, and regulatory powers will be exercised only if the voluntary approach does 
not deliver the hoped for results.74 The factors that may be used for identifying the 
beneficiaries of the community energy right include distance from the facility, the 
number of residents, and administrative boundaries.75 Furthermore, due to high levels 
of energy poverty in the UK, approaches to enable poorer segments of the population 
to engage with community energy through the establishment social enterprises have 
been experimented with in Scotland, with alternate fortunes.76  
Even though there are marked differences between the approaches to the 
definition of community membership in the UK and Denmark, a geographical 
criterion has prevailed in both. This focus on communities of place is associated with 
a desire to deliver social acceptance and counter local resistance to the development 
of projects, and chimes with the approach adopted in the recast Renewables Directive. 
Communities of place are in principle better equipped to access the natural resources 
needed to generate some forms of renewable energy, such as water (in the case of 
hydro) or land (in the case of wind). When a community does not have access to these 
already, however, the issue is whether and how law and policy facilitate access to 
these resources. In Denmark, for example, expropriations for the establishment of 
wind farms must simply comply with general planning law requirements.77 
Scotland has taken a rather original approach to this matter, by adopting a 
policy target for community ownership,78 coupled with a right to buy land, even in 
cases where the land owner is unwilling to sell.79 The Community Empowerment 
(Scotland) Act 2015 introduced communities’ right to acquire land ‘wholly or mainly 
                                                 
73 Infrastructure Act (2015), paras 38-39. The parallel with Danish law is highlighted also in 
McHarg (n 17) 302.  
74 DECC, Infrastructure Bill: The Community Electricity Right Policy Brief (2014). 
75 Infrastructure Act (2015), schedule 6.  
76 One example of such endeavours was Our Power, which operated between 2015 and 2019, 
before running into difficulties and ceasing to trade in January 2019: https://our-power.co.uk/about  
accessed 2 February 2019.  
77 See for example Planning Act (Denmark), Consolidated Act No. 813 of 21 June 2007. 
sections 47-50. See the analysis in Danish Nature Agency: Naturstyrelsen (2015) available at 
http://naturstyrelsen.dk/media/131731/vejledning_06012015_web.pdf  accessed 25 January 2019, 19.   
78 Scottish Government, Electricity Generation Policy Statement (2013); and the targets in 
Scottish Government, Scottish Energy Strategy (2017) 42, which maintains: ‘Our ambition remains to 
ensure that, by 2020, at least half of newly consented renewable energy projects will have an element 
of shared ownership.’ 
79 See McHarg (n 17) 307–310; Malcolm Combe, ‘The Environmental Implications of 
Redistributive Land Reform’ (2016) 18 Environmental L Rev104.  
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abandoned or neglected’ or somehow managed in a way that was detrimental to a 
community’s ‘environmental wellbeing’.80 In addition, the Land Reform (Scotland) 
Act 2016 introduced a community right to buy land to further sustainable 
development, which became operational in July 2018.81 These seemingly radical steps 
were taken in the context of a pattern of land-ownership that, for historical reasons, 
was reportedly one of the most concentrated in the world.82 So far, no evidence exists 
that this new right has been used to initiate community energy projects. In fact, 
community land acquisitions may well end up favouring other land uses, such as the 
establishment of protected areas, with the aim of preventing renewable energy 
developments.  
The case of Scotland also suggests that there may be entrenched barriers to 
communities’ full project ownership. The Scottish Government had initially 
introduced policy targets for full community ownership, 83  but the 2017 Energy 
Strategy favours shared ownership. 84  Yet, evidence from Denmark suggests that 
shared ownership arrangements only propel community energy to a rather limited 
extent.85 
Finally, the focus on community of place in existing laws and policies raises 
the question of whether and how communities of interest should be better 
accommodated in policies and laws concerning community energy. At least in 
principle, project shares could be offered to all those willing to engage, rather than 
just local residents. Experience with equity-based crowdfunding – i.e. with investors 
purchasing an equity stake in the form of securities in a project or a commercial 
company86 – suggests that there may be considerable financial opportunities to be 
seized by expanding the boundaries of project ownership beyond the local level. 
Unconventional sources of finance from willing citizens have reportedly played an 
increasingly prominent role in supporting community energy, especially in contexts 
                                                 
80 Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act (2015) s 74 
81 Land Reform (Scotland) Act (2016) Part 5. 
82 Annie McKee and others, ‘The Scottish Private Estate’ in Jayne Glass and others (eds) 
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84 Scottish Government, Scottish Energy Strategy (2017) 63. 
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86 See Catherine Banet, ‘Enabling the Crowdfunding of Energy Projects’ in Lila Barrera-
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where public finance is scarce. 87  And while pioneer countries have resorted to 
geographical criteria to determine the scope of community membership, a more 
flexible approach to the definition of community has already started to emerge, with 
nuancing between ‘host’ and ‘less immediate’ communities, in relation, for example, 
to off-shore renewable energy.88  
The implementation of the recast Renewables Directive therefore calls for 
more reflection on how law and policy define community membership and 
ownership, in order to better understand what are the more promising avenues to spur 
community action. The best opportunities for citizen-driven renewable energy 
generation may well reside in likeminded actors that do not necessarily live next to 
one another – as the case of solar cooperatives mushrooming all over pioneer Member 
States well demonstrates89 – rather than in communities living in the proximity of 
renewable energy projects as envisioned by the recast Renewables Directive. 
3.2 Building Communities’ Capacity  
The literature often portrays community projects as a means to broaden access to 
energy within society,90 as well as to address justice questions associated with the 
energy transition.91 Yet, in and of themselves, these projects raise specific questions 
on how to engender communities’ capacity to engage in the development and 
operation of renewable energy plants. For example, full project ownership often 
requires communities to collaborate, or even take the lead, in the establishment and/or 
management of renewable energy generation plants.92 This in turn presupposes a set 
of capabilities that can either already be embedded in a community, or be engendered 
by means of external support.  
The recast Renewables Directive explicitly requires that regulatory and 
capacity-building support is provided to public authorities to enable and set up 
renewable energy communities, and to help such authorities to participate directly in 
community projects.93 This requirement has clear implications for energy governance 
                                                 
87 See ibid., 324; and DECC, Community Energy Strategy Update (2015) 22. 
88 See Bristow, Cowell and Munday (n 50); Barton and Goldsmith (n 62) 40.  
89 See for example https://www.edinburghsolar.coop/ last accessed 27 December 2018. 
90 See for example Saunders, Gross and Wade (n 8). 
91 See for example Jenkins and others (n 9) 177. 
92 This issue is raised for example in Oteman, Wiering and Helderman (n 16). 
93 Recast Renewables Directive (n 13) Article 22.4.h.  
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at the national and subnational levels, and may pave the way to new forms of EU 
scrutiny over the allocation and exercise of administrative powers within Member 
States. 
Pioneer countries present significant differences concerning institutional 
support for community action. In Denmark the diffusion of community energy during 
the so-called oil-crisis and ‘energy austerity’ in the ‘70s was largely driven by farmers 
cooperatives and by the extensive powers of local authorities in matters of planning 
and the supply of public services, including energy. 94  Similarly, the literature 
commonly attributes the recent flourishing of community energy in Germany to local 
entrepreneurship and to the leadership of technical and political pioneers,95 coupled 
with the exercise of the extensive powers of local authorities96 and the networking of 
community actors.97  
Conversely, the UK presented a less favourable institutional landscape in 
support of community action. Due to local authorities’ limited powers on energy 
governance, and the limited diffusion of the cooperative model, the recent adoption of 
community energy policies in England, Wales and Scotland was accompanied by the 
establishment of intermediaries supporting communities in their interactions with both 
authorities and corporate actors. The literature describes intermediaries as 
organisations ‘connecting local projects with one another’ as well as ‘with the wider 
world’, and thus helping to generate a ‘shared institutional infrastructure’ and 
knowledge transfer to sustain projects. 98  These intermediaries have reportedly 
appeared ‘in waves’, with a decisive acceleration in recent years, as a result of the 
adoption of renewable energy targets at the EU, national and subnational levels.99  
The plethora of actors presently working with community energy in the UK 
includes intermediaries established by national and subnational governments, as well 
                                                 
94 Sovacool (n 11) 830. 
95 As suggested for example in Jürgen Hauber and Chantal Ruppert-Winkel, ‘Moving towards 
Energy Self-Sufficiency Based on Renewables: Comparative Case Studies on the Emergence of 
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96 Stephen Hall, Timothy Foxon and Ronan Bolton, ‘Financing the Civic Energy Sector: How 
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Energy Research & Social Science 5, 9. 
97 Süsser, Döring and Ratter (n 66) 332. 
98 See Tom Hargreaves and others, ‘Grassroots Innovations in Community Energy: The Role 
of Intermediaries in Niche Development’ (2013) 23 Global Environmental Change 868, 870. 
99 ibid, 870 and 872. 
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as non-governmental organisations and private sector professionals.100 Far from being 
mere neutral brokers providing a shared institutional infrastructure and enabling 
knowledge transfer, intermediaries have increasingly become ‘framers and 
coordinators’ of community action,101 professional services providers and even project 
partners. This phenomenon became particularly evident after the recent reform of UK 
renewable energy subsidies, which turned some intermediaries into project co-owners 
and shareholders, in order to ensure the continued viability of community projects.102 
Rather problematically, no safeguards presently exist in the UK to ensure that these 
intermediaries do not take advantage of their position in relations with communities.  
Therefore, while intermediaries in the UK have been crucial builders of 
communities’ capacity to engage in renewable energy generation, the implementation 
of the recast Renewables Directive calls for a better understanding of the advantages 
and disadvantages of involving professional brokers, and of whether these ought to be 
regulated, and how, in order to address conflicts of interest that may arise in the 
performance of capacity-building and support activities. More generally, the Directive 
raises questions over the factors that successfully support community action and on 
what can be done in states where local authorities’ powers on energy matters are 
limited.   
3.3 Access to Finance and Markets  
The mainstreaming of community energy greatly depends on the long-term 
sustainability of community energy projects. If projects are short-lived and end in 
disappointment, it is clearly hard to persuade other communities to become involved. 
The most existential question concerning the development of community projects is 
therefore that of access to financial resources, both to develop renewable energy 
generation plants, as well as to secure their upkeep and viability over time.  
Different community ownership patterns have different financial implications. 
With shared ownership, access to finance may be necessary to enable whole 
communities, or individual community members, to become involved in projects 
                                                 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid, 876. 
102 As discussed in Andy Lyle (Locogen), Shared Ownership Lessons. Presentation delivered 
at the 2017 edition of the Scottish Government’s Community and Renewable Energy Scheme 
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initiated and managed by others. With full community ownership, instead, the issue is 
rather to secure funds to initiate renewable energy projects. Literature from the social 
sciences has dedicated much attention to this topic, comparing different models and 
forms of support.103 
Law and policy undoubtedly have a role to play in enabling community access 
to finance. In this connection, the recast Renewables Directive sketches out the core 
elements of a level playing field, requesting that Member States facilitate 
communities’ access to finance and information; 104  and take into account 
‘specificities’ of renewable energy communities in order to allow them to compete for 
support on an ‘equal footing’ with other market participants when designing 
‘measures that promote the use of renewable energy’.105 The Directive defines the 
latter as measures reducing the cost of energy, increasing the price at which it can be 
sold, or increasing the volume of such energy purchased, including through: 
investment aid, tax exemptions or reductions, tax refunds, renewable energy 
obligation support schemes, and direct price support schemes, including feed-in tariffs 
and sliding or fixed premium payments. 106  These measures are expected to be 
implemented without prejudice to state aid rules under Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).107   
The Directive’s requirement that renewable energy communities compete for 
support on an equal footing with other market participants may not be compatible 
with the dedicated start up finance for the development of community projects, which 
is common practice in all pioneer countries. For example, in Denmark a fund 
established by law and replenished by way of energy taxes supports preliminary 
investigations by local wind turbine owners associations.108 Similarly, the Scottish 
Government’s Community and Renewable Energy Scheme provides funds to help 
communities start renewable energy projects and fund pre-planning costs. 109 
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Cooperative lending in Germany – partially funded by the German Public 
Development Bank – has historically supported community action, sponsoring the 
acquisition of renewable energy facilities by co-operatives, private householders and 
communities.110  
The main means to secure finance to ensure the long-term viability of 
community projects, however, is the ability to sell community-produced renewable 
energy on the market. The recast Renewables Directive explicitly requires Member 
States to enable communities to access to ‘all suitable’ energy markets, with non-
discriminatory treatment when compared with other market participants.111 
The practice of pioneer states is uneven in this regard. In Germany, 
community projects are subjected to special auctioning rules, vis-à-vis projects by 
commercial operators.112 Evidence from Denmark and the UK, conversely, indicates 
that the creation of a level playing field between energy producers has historically 
favoured commercial operators with large development portfolios.113 
The challenges associated with building a level playing field have become 
manifest with recent feed-in tariff reforms. Feed-in tariffs have been introduced in 
several countries around the world to stimulate the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies.114 The ways in which these tariffs are structured and reviewed over time, 
however, may have significant impacts on investors, and especially on community 
ones. 115  And while feed-in tariffs are expected to be discontinued eventually, the 
timing of their phasing out is crucial.116  
Community projects in the UK were hit particularly hard by recent renewable 
energy subsidy reforms, which have been linked to an increasing number of failed or 
stalled community projects.117 By comparison, in Germany and Denmark the sustained 
use of fixed feed-in tariffs has historically been crucial to the consolidation of 
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community energy, providing confidence and certainty in investment returns.118 In 
Germany, nevertheless, the widespread uptake of renewable energy has engendered 
unexpected, perverse outcomes for the cost of electricity, placing financial burdens on 
lower income households, and benefitting upper income ones.119 Measures to address 
this inefficiency have recently been put in place, resulting in a slowdown in the 
uptake of community energy.120 
As the recent landslide of litigation associated with reforms in some EU 
Member States eloquently illustrates, setting the right level of renewable energy 
subsidies is not easy, 121  and not only in relation to community projects. 122  The 
implementation of the recast Renewables Directive, however, will bring in an 
additional layer of complexity, requesting Member States to factor in the specificities 
of community energy when reforming renewable support schemes.123 
A related vexed question is that of access to the electricity grid. Even though 
new ways of transmitting electricity are being explored, including through mini and 
smart grids,124 by and large community projects aiming to sell energy on the market 
need to be connected to the national/regional grid. In this regard, the recast 
Renewables Directive requires Member States to ensure that the relevant distribution 
system operator cooperates with renewable energy communities to facilitate energy 
transfers within communities, while at the same time, ensuring that renewable energy 
communities that supply energy provide aggregation or other commercial energy 
services ‘are subject to the provisions relevant for such activities’. 125  Renewable 
energy communities are expected to contribute in ‘an adequate, fair and balanced 
way’ to the overall cost sharing of the system ‘in line with a transparent cost-benefit 
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analysis of distributed energy sources’ by the competent national authorities.126  It 
therefore seems clear that the Directive does not intend to stimulate the uptake of 
community energy whatever the cost. The matter of access to the grid, however, has 
proven to be particularly sensitive in pioneer states. 
All pioneer countries provide some form of statutory access to the electricity 
grid for community energy. Yet in practice, connection costs have hindered the 
commercial viability of several projects. Again, the UK is a case in point, with 
communities required to bear grid connection costs, including a share of the costs of 
network reinforcement.127 As a result, the costs associated with grid access have been 
a significant obstacle for the development of projects in marginal areas with great 
renewable energy generation potential, like the Scottish islands. 128  Conversely, in 
Denmark, connection costs are shared, and grid operators take charge of expansion 
and upgrade costs. 129  In Germany, the expansion of community energy has 
engendered momentum for the re-municipalisation of electricity grids by local 
authorities. 130  Admittedly, public ownership provides no guarantee of improved 
distributional and economic efficiency outcomes, 131  but the establishment of a 
publicly-owned, not-for-profit energy company is presently under consideration in 
Scotland, with the objective, amongst others, to support local energy generation.132 
More generally, questions of access to the energy grid underlie deeper 
interrogatives on how to reform existing energy governance and infrastructure 
arrangements in order to accommodate community energy. The implementation of the 
recast Renewables Directive therefore calls for greater reflection on how renewable 
energy subsidies and grid access can be best designed to mainstream and make 
community energy investments resilient and cost-effective in the long run.  
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3.4 Decision-making, Burden- and Benefit-sharing  
Even though community projects are expected to engender greater and better citizen 
involvement in decisions over renewable energy generation plants and a fairer 
distribution of the related burden and benefits, they also raise questions over who 
participates in decision-making, how and on what terms. Like any other development 
changing the status quo, in fact, community energy projects require that new 
equilibria be found between societal interests intersecting in a specific site. For 
example, depending on the technology deployed, those residing in the vicinity of a 
renewable energy generation plant may be exposed to noise and other forms of 
nuisance, and/or suffer a loss in the value of their real estate. In this regard, 
community energy projects posit questions that do not significantly differ from non-
community owned ones, which concern the compensation of those negatively affected 
by the development and operation of a given plant, and the sharing of the benefits 
produced by it. 
Evidence of community projects that have engendered a remarkable degree of 
opposition certainly exists. One eloquent example is the Viking Energy project in 
Shetland. A joint venture between the local community and a utility company, this 
large-scale, shared ownership community project was authorised in 2007 with the aim 
to set 103 wind turbines around Shetland, generating a potential output of up to 457 
megawatts, one of the largest in the UK. Twelve years on, however, the project has 
attracted a flurry of public opposition and litigation – instigated on the basis of 
legislation concerning the protection of birds’ habitats,133 and on the rights of local 
crofters134 – and remains far from completion. Similarly, in England, planning law has 
been successfully used to argue that the donation to local residents of a proportion of 
the turnover from a community renewable energy development should not be the 
subject of a material consideration on the related planning application.135 
The recast Renewables Directive does not say much on how to address 
challenges such as these. The Directive requires that Member States ensure that 
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‘unjustified regulatory and administrative barriers’ are removed and that community 
projects are subject to ‘fair, proportionate and transparent procedures’, including on 
registration and licensing. 136  The Directive does not provide much detail on the 
procedures to be adopted. Equally, the Directive expects community energy projects 
‘to provide environmental, economic or social community benefits for its members or 
the local areas where it operates rather than financial profits’.137 This requirement 
seemingly expects community projects to deliver more than just electricity and 
financial returns. Yet the Directive does not specify how such environmental, 
economic, or social benefits ought to be defined, measured or reported. 
These matters are left to Member States to address, in the general frame set by 
EU law instruments on environmental impact assessment,138 public participation,139 
access to justice and access to environmental information.140 These instruments are not 
specifically designed to deal with community energy. Rather, community energy 
projects are yet another type of activity falling within the scope of application of these 
instruments. In this connection, a fundamental distinction has to be drawn between 
intra-community relations – i.e. between those involved in a given project – and extra-
community relations – i.e. between those taking part in a community project and other 
local residents and stakeholders who are not involved in a given project.  
As far as intra-community relations are concerned, projects in full community 
ownership may be expected to deliver a greater degree of community control, and to 
put community members at the centre of decision-making processes. In principle, 
therefore, community ownership should mean greater public acceptance and fewer 
complaints over the loss of amenity associated with the development and operation of 
a project. The issue is, however, to understand whether this assumption is well 
founded in practice.  
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Very little literature exists on how energy communities make decisions, and 
what processes exist to ensure legitimacy and fairness in deliberative processes.141 The 
legal form of community endeavours may determine some aspects of communities’ 
internal organisation. For example, legislation on cooperatives may require specific 
decision-making processes. Other aspects, nevertheless, are likely to be left entirely to 
communities’ self-organisation. While this margin of discretion chimes with 
empowerment and self-governance narratives,142 it may also engender conflict and 
exclusion, starting from the point at which the scope of community is defined, and 
continuing into day-to-day decision-making.143  
The matter of extra-community relations, conversely, is better regulated. 
Community projects are subjected to screening and approval, like any other 
development. These requirements vary from one legal system to the other, but 
planning law typically enables stakeholders (eg nature and heritage conservation 
organisations) and/or those affected (eg neighbouring estates) to object to 
developments in the context of the planning permission process. In future, planning 
law is expected to acquire an increasingly prominent role in the context of the 
decentralisation of energy production. 144  Furthermore, depending on their size, 
community energy projects are likely to be subjected to an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA).145 EIAs are an important means for the public to have a say on 
whether or not a project ought to be carried out, its siting and design. In the EU a 
level playing field on this issue may be said to exist, at least in principle, due to the 
implementation of the EIA Directive.146 Before a project gets underway, therefore, 
EIAs and planning processes provide opportunities to debate burden-sharing, in the 
context of decisions over project siting. When a project has been approved, negative 
impacts may be mitigated by means of compensation, obtained through the exercise 
of tort or public law remedies.  
Innovative solutions to deal with these kinds of challenges have been 
experimented with in Denmark, where a semi-automatic mechanism for the 
                                                 
141  As noted also in Bregje van Veelen, ‘Negotiating Energy Democracy in Practice: 
Governance Processes in Community Energy Projects’ (2018) 27 Environmental Politics 644. 
142 Slee and Harnmeijer (n 11) 45. 
143 As noted in Aitken, McDonald and Strachan (n 54). 
144 Tomain (n 12) 212. 
145 See for example Danish Planning Act, section 35, as discussed in Rønne (n 17) 179–180.  
146 Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment (codification) [2011]OJ L26/1 as amended.  
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compensation for the loss of value of real estate exists. In particular, Danish law 
requires those developing new wind energy generation plants to compensate those 
affected before a project is developed, and only if the loss is of a certain quantity.147 
As Rønne notes, this arrangement conveys the impression that windfarms are a source 
of nuisance by default. 148  Questions have been raised also over the adequacy of 
compensation provided – which only covers some impacts, such as loss of value, but 
not all loss of amenity – and over the fact that receiving compensation hinders 
subsequent legal action, even where the nuisance or loss of value are greater than 
estimated.149  
Finally, EIA and planning law intertwine with the protection of human rights 
obligations enshrined in international, regional, or national law, requiring states to 
establish procedures enabling those affected to be informed and heard during the 
planning phase, to enjoy access to adequate remedies to address grievances, and to 
assess negative impacts on the enjoyment of human rights. State obligations in this 
connection have most recently been elucidated by the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a 
safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.150 While states generally enjoy a 
certain discretion in striking a balance between legitimate societal interests, that 
balance cannot be unreasonable or result in unjustified, foreseeable infringements of 
human rights.151 In assessing whether a balance is reasonable, relevant factors include 
whether the decision-making process satisfies the procedural obligations described 
above; whether its outcomes accord with national and international standards; 
whether they are not retrogressive and non-discriminatory. 152 While differences in 
implementation clearly exist in practice, the 1998 Aarhus Convention153 has created a 
minimum set of core obligations across the EU on these matters.154 In practice, some 
                                                 
147 Promotion of Renewable Energy Act (n 67), Part 2. See also the analysis in Rønne (n 17) 
188–189. 
148 As suggested also in Rønne (n 17) 190. 
149 As noted for example in Jørgensen (n 17). 
150 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, UN Doc A/HRC/37/59 (24 January 
2018). 
151 Ibid., 32-33.  
152 Ibid., principles 7-11. 
153 See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 2161 UNTS 447 (1998), arts 5, 6 and 9.  
154 As noted for example in Marjan Peeters and Thomas Schomerus, ‘Modifying Our Society 
with Law’ (2014) 4 Climate L 131, 303. 
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human rights-based complaints against the development of renewable energy projects 
have already been made, both in the context of the European Convention of Human 
Rights155 and of the Aarhus Convention.156  
No systematic study of public opposition to and litigation over community 
energy projects has been carried out to date.157 The evidence is anecdotal and patchy. 
The impending implementation of the Renewables Directive therefore calls for 
greater analysis of the circumstances in which community projects attract public 
opposition, and why. This understanding would provide precious insights for policy-
makers looking at removing ‘unjustified regulatory and administrative barriers’ to 
community projects and at ‘fair, proportionate and transparent procedures’ to make 
them happen, as required by the Directive.  
A similar scarcity of data exists in relation to benefit-sharing arrangements 
associated with community projects. Benefit-sharing arrangements are widespread 
practice in various natural resource management and extractive activities, both to 
mitigate the negative impacts of, and reduce opposition to, projects and increase their 
social acceptance.158 The contours of developers’ obligations are context specific and 
depend on the applicable legal frameworks, as well as on industry practices. 
Communities living in the vicinity of a renewable energy generation project typically 
receive various economic and non-economic advantages from the developers, 159 
including for example monetary payments per capacity installed, 160  as well as 
electricity at discounted prices or grants to support energy efficiency. Indeed, the 
practice of offering shares in projects developed by commercial operators – as in 
                                                 
155 See European Court of Human Rights, Fägerskiöld v Sweden, Application no. 37664/04 
Admissibility; and European Court of Human Rights, Vecbaštika and Others v Latvia, Application no. 
52499/11, Pending. 
156  See for example Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee Communication 
ACCC/C/2012/68, where the UK was found not to be in compliance with Article 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention, because its National Renewable Energy Plan was not subjected to public participation.  
157 While the matter of litigation associated with the establishment of wind farms is well 
covered in the literature – on the UK see e.g. Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Law and Energy Transitions: Wind 
Turbines and Planning Law in the UK’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 528 – to the 
knowledge of the author none of these studies has considered specifically litigation associated with 
community projects. 
158 See for example the analysis in Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal 
Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing’ (2016) 27 EJIL 353. 
159 As explained for example in Rønne (n 17) 180; LeRoy C Paddock and Max Greenblum, 
‘Community Benefit Agreements for Wind Farm Siting in Context’ in Lila Barrera-Hernandez and 
others (eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity: Legal Change and 
Impact on Communities (OUP2016). 
160 See for example Scottish Parliament Brief, Renewable Energy: Community Benefit and 
Ownership (2012) 13. 
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Denmark – may in and of itself be viewed as a means to share economic benefits with 
local communities.161 Developers may furthermore offer communities non-monetary 
benefits, such as the development of common facilities for recreation, education, etc.  
When a community, rather than a commercial operator, is in charge of a 
project, benefit-sharing arrangements assume both intra- and extra-community 
nuances. At the intra-community level, it is up to communities to choose how to 
govern their internal arrangements, though intermediaries can be important in steering 
community practice in this connection. At the extra-community level, the question of 
benefit-sharing re-surfaces in relation to those who are not part of a given project. 
This in turn translates into a set of questions on who benefits, how, and the criteria to 
identify benefits and beneficiaries.  
No standard practice concerning benefit-sharing has emerged in pioneer states. 
The practice of so-called ‘community protocols’ – borrowed from other areas from 
natural resource management162 – has been used as a means to empower communities 
in relations with developers, as well as public authorities. Intermediaries have played 
an important role in the design of model protocol templates and, more generally, in 
engendering community capacity to negotiate benefits. 163  Some law-makers have 
adopted voluntary guidelines on community benefits,164 whereas others have adopted 
a more institutionalised approach to benefit-sharing.165 There is, however, a great deal 
of variation amongst states, and even within the same state. For example, benefit-
sharing is not a formal requirement in the UK, 166  even though it is expected in 
practice.167 Scotland has created a registry giving visibility to community benefits and 
adopted guidelines on what benefits should consist of, as well as how they should be 
determined, placing emphasis on dialogue with communities, but leaving it to 
developers to identify who these may be.168  
In spite of their widespread uptake, the literature reports how benefit-sharing 
                                                 
161 McHarg (n 17) 301–302. 
162 See for example Harry Jonas, Kabir Bavikatte and Holly Shrumm, ‘Community Protocols 
and Access and Benefit-Sharing’ (2010) 12 Asian Biotechnology and Development Review 49. 
163 As reported for example in Bristow, Cowell and Munday (n 50) 1115. 
164 See for example Scottish Government, Good Practice Principles for Community Benefits 
from Onshore Renewable Developments (2015). 
165 For Denmark, see Promotion of Renewable Energy Act (n 67), ss 13–17. 
166 See DECC, Benefits Best Practice Guidance (2014). 
167 As noted in McHarg (n 17) 306. 
168 See Scottish Government, Good Practice Principles for Community Benefits from Onshore 
Renewable Developments (2013) 6-7.  
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arrangements still tend to be perceived as a bribe to secure project approval and/or 
minimise public resistance.169 Some authors point to the advantages of greater benefits 
institutionalisation associated with shared project ownership 170 and of spelling out 
benefits in more positive terms.171 Increasing opposition to the development of wind 
farms in Denmark, however, does not necessarily corroborate this proposition.172 
More generally, the literature points out how, while policy-making in pioneer 
countries has relied on the assumption that communities of place tend to privilege 
long-term, collective benefits, this assumption is not necessarily justified in 
practice. 173  Little systematic information exists on benefit-sharing arrangements 
associated with community projects. Since the recast Renewables Directive stipulates 
that community energy projects deliver benefits to the communities involved, as well 
as those affected, greater and deeper scholarly enquiry is needed to shed light on what 
may be regarded as best practices to ensure that community projects deliver the 
benefits they are expected to produce.  
4 An Agenda for Future Research  
The implementation of the recast Renewables Directive is expected to turn 
communities across the EU into prominent actors in the energy transition and to 
deliver more decentralised and polycentric energy governance. Law and policy have 
an important role to play in this transformation, by addressing the complex, layered, 
regulatory questions associated with turning community projects from grassroots into 
mainstream. 
This article has mapped the main regulatory questions underlying the 
implementation of the Directive’s provisions concerning community energy, 
                                                 
169 See for example Noel Cass, Gordon Walker and Patrick Devine-Wright, ‘Good Neighbours, 
Public Relations and Bribes: The Politics and Perceptions of Community Benefit Provision in 
Renewable Energy Development in the UK’ (2010) 12 J of Environmental Policy & Planning 255; 
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providing insights into the way in which they have been addressed in pioneer EU 
Member States. While the answers to these regulatory questions will vary, depending 
on the political, economic and social characteristics of different locations, the 
preliminary investigation carried out in this paper has identified a set of clear 
knowledge gaps. 
First, the implementation of the recast Renewables Directive calls for more 
analysis of how law and policy define community membership and ownership in 
different contexts. This analysis is necessary to understand what kind of community – 
community of place vis-à-vis community of interest – and ownership patterns – 
shared vis-à-vis full ownership – ought to be favoured and, ultimately, what meaning 
to attach to the notion of effective community control enshrined in the Directive.  
Second, there is a need for greater study of measures that successfully support 
and build communities’ capacity to engage in renewable energy generation, including 
the regulation of intermediaries, and of what can be done in states where local 
authorities’ powers on these matters are limited.   
Third, there is a need to urgently address the question of how to best reform 
existing energy governance and infrastructure arrangements in order to accommodate 
community energy, especially in relation to subsidies and access to the electricity 
grid. It is crucial to identify the regulatory conditions that make community energy 
viable in the long run, the conditions that make projects fail, and lessons that may be 
learnt from such failures.  
Fourth, greater and better knowledge of when community projects attract 
public opposition would provide precious insights into how to remove regulatory and 
administrative barriers to, and create fair, proportionate and transparent procedures 
for community projects, as required by the Directive.  
Finally, since the recast Renewables Directive stipulates that community 
energy projects deliver benefits to the communities involved, greater and better 
knowledge is required to shed light on practices that ensure that community projects 
actually produce benefits. 
The answers to these questions are not readily available and simply 
transplanting solutions from one place to the other is unlikely to work. Adjustments in 
energy governance arrangements require time, through a trial and error process that 
has only just begun. Furthermore, the implementation of the recast Renewables 
Directive endows the EU with new powers of scrutiny, the exercise and implications 
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of which remain to be seen. What is certain is that the implementation of the Directive 
will initiate a quest for solutions to the regulatory questions flagged above, both 
across and within EU Member States. 
Addressing the gaps in knowledge identified in this article therefore could not 
be more timely. The imminent implementation of the Renewables and the Electricity 
Directives makes it critical to capture and share the lessons learned from both success 
and failure in those Member States that have pioneered the mainstreaming of 
community energy. And with states all over the world looking for ways to ensure 
access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all, the lessons 
learned from this exercise are likely to resonate well beyond the boundaries of the 
EU. This article has argued that greater scholarly enquiry into the role of law and 
policy to propel community agency is in order, opening a debate and pointing towards 
the way in which further research should venture. 
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